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Fraud doesn’t start at the bank. So why does most of the prevention?

6 hours ago
5 min read

Insights from our Research Sprint delivered in partnership with FinTech West Fraud is now the most common crime in the UK. It makes up 45% of all crime, with an estimated 4.15 million incidents against individuals in the year to September 2025. Reported losses reached £3.5 billion in the year to October 2025, an average of £10,300 per report.

Most of that fraud ends with a payment, but very little of it starts there. A victim usually first meets the scam somewhere else: a fake advert, a marketplace listing, a message on WhatsApp. That is often days or weeks before any money moves. UK Finance figures show that 70% of authorised push payment (APP) scams start online. On Revolut's own anonymised data for 2025, Meta-owned platforms were where 44% of APP scams started. Facebook alone accounted for more than 21% and WhatsApp a further 17%.


Banks, in other words, are being asked to stop a crime that was set up long before they could see it. The Government's own Fraud Strategy calls financial services the "last line of defence". Our latest Collaborative Challenge asked what it would take to move that defence further up the line.


The real cost goes beyond the money

The economic and social cost of fraud in England and Wales was at least £14.4 billion in 2023–24. The human cost is harder to measure, and it doesn't track the amount lost. In one survey of victims, 92% had emotional or mental health symptoms, 57% had a physical health symptom and 63% said their behaviour had changed for good. Some became so wary that they pulled back from financial life altogether.


The harm also spreads further. Organised crime groups put fraud profits back into growing their operations. Some overseas scam compounds are staffed by people who have been trafficked and forced to run scams. Payment fraud and modern slavery are directly linked.


What we did

In June 2026, Future Finance and FinTech West brought together people from banking, fintech, academia (including the University of Bristol and Cardiff University), law and policy. We met for three sessions at Triodos Bank in Bristol. The question was simple to state and hard to answer:

How do we tackle payment fraud at source, across the whole scam journey, rather than managing it after the fact?

Three things that changed our thinking

1. The gap between where fraud starts and where the sector steps in. Fraud defences are concentrated at the moment of payment, through checks, warnings and friction. By then the persuasion has usually already worked. Banks see little of what happens beforehand and have few formal links to the platforms and phone networks where it happens. The new Online Crime Centre, launched in 2026 with £31 million of funding, is built to bring those sectors together. Its success will depend on how fully industry takes part.

2. Vulnerability is a moment, not a type of person. Anyone can be vulnerable after a bereavement, a break-up, a job loss, money pressure or a big life change such as starting university. Flagging fixed groups, such as older customers, misses most people who are in a vulnerable moment right now. Changes in someone's spending or the way they contact their bank can reveal those moments as they happen. The Financial Inclusion Strategy and the FCA's Consumer Duty both already recognise that vulnerability comes and goes.

3. Sharing data is legal. The joined-up working isn't there yet. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 makes fraud prevention a lawful reason to share data between organisations. Even so, someone flagged as a fraud victim at one bank usually isn't flagged at another. That matters, because victims' details are often sold on and they get targeted again. Home Office research with Ipsos, published in July 2026, found that 60% of people drawn into money muling had been fraud victims before. 80% were recruited by someone they knew. The risk is real and measurable, yet no one across the system can currently see it.


Six actions for industry bodies

Each recommendation builds on government work that already exists or has been announced, rather than competing with it.

  1. Hold platforms to measurable standards. Use the Online Advertising Taskforce to propose minimum expectations for the platforms, marketplaces and phone networks where fraud starts. These should cover checking advertisers' identities, quick removal of reported scams, keeping evidence, stopping repeat offenders and publishing data on where fraud comes from. Government should also test whether firms that fail to apply reasonable controls should share the cost.

  2. Make the Online Crime Centre work in practice. Agree exactly what banks, platforms, phone networks, payment firms and police share, in what format and how quickly, with feedback built in. Start with pilots on a few fraud types and measure the results: scam accounts and adverts taken down, payments stopped.

  3. Build a "voluntary friction" framework. Let customers opt in to extra checks during risky periods of their life, for example after a bereavement or a big change in their circumstances. This should be led by the sector and designed to sit alongside the Home Office's Financial Safeguarding Scheme, not duplicate it.

  4. Share fraud victim flags across banks in real time. The legal basis exists. So does a working model, UK Finance's Vulnerable Victim Notification Scheme, which is being extended to all police forces. CIFAS already runs a shared database, but it tracks perpetrators, not victims. Industry should push, through the Home Office's Data Strategy, for victim flagging as a standard in its own right.

  5. Shape the Fraud Victims Charter before it's finalised. The Charter is due in 2027 and is still being consulted on. Industry should call for a shared definition of repeat-victim risk and a "protection period" of extra safeguards straight after a fraud. It should also push for "financial exploitation" to become the standard term.

  6. Put fraud into financial education. Financial education is becoming compulsory in primary schools in England, and the Home Office is bringing fraud education into schools and universities from 2026/27. The two plans aren't yet formally linked. The sector has the expertise to connect them. Research shows young people respond best to concrete consequences, such as losing access to a mortgage, student loan or phone contract, rather than abstract warnings about prosecution.


The bottom line

Payment fraud is not mainly a personal failing. It's a system failing. Banks, the platforms where fraud begins and the agencies that hold intelligence all have the ability and the responsibility to act. The biggest opportunity is to strengthen the links between them, and to warn people at every step of the scam, not just at the final click. Read the full report here


 
 
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